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Cornhusker Economics
Consumer Response to Fraudulent Producer Behavior
in the Agri-food Marketing System
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

*

4 Wks
Ago

5/29/1
8

124.37

*

180.95

188.56

*

158.50

149.97

*

246.28

218.64

229.34

71.31

58.37

66.06

89.11

67.61

74.44

160.94

148.82

152.25

411.65

374.61

381.03

3.14

4.56

4.92

3.40

3.71

3.76

8.43

9.61

9.55

5.75

5.94

5.89

2.89

2.78

2.92

136.25

*

*

70.00

100.00

*

65.00

100.00

100.00

103.50

170.00

155.00

40.00

53.50

47.50

Over the last decade, food fraud scandals, such as the
adulteration of Chinese milk with melamine, the discovery of horsemeat in many European meat products, and the mislabeling of Italian olive oils, have increased the attention of the media, consumers, and
governments about the vulnerability of the food system to intentional adulteration or misrepresentation
of product ingredients or products themselves based
on economic motives (Lotta and Bogue 2015). Food
fraud is defined as the intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food products for economic gains (Spink and Moyer 2011).
Food fraud is motivated by economic gain and is enabled by two important features. First, consumers cannot verify the presence of economically important
attributes, such as whether a product is “organic,”
even after having consumed the good, for many of the
products affected by food fraud. These types of goods
are called credence goods. Second, the monitoring of
labeling or certification requirements is costly, so the
enforcement of product claims is imperfect.
Olive oil is one of the food categories most vulnerable
to food fraud (Johnson 2014). The most common
types of olive oil fraud involve the substitution or
adulteration of extra virgin olive oil (EVOO) with less
expensive or lower quality alternatives. To be considered extra virgin, rather than a lower quality olive oil,
the product must meet strict criteria, including restrictions on the processes used to extract the oil from
the olive, and the requirements on the chemical composition—such as the free fatty acid content—of the
oil. A number of recent investigations have identified
fraudulent behavior in widely sold EVOOs. Conducting one of the largest olive oil fraud investigations on
186 samples of EVOO sold in California, scientists
from the University of California, Davis Olive Center
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found that 73 percent of the samples produced by the top
five imported EVOO brands in the United States were either mislabeled or adulterated. Moreover, about 11 percent
of top-selling Italian EVOO brands failed to meet the criteria that define EVOO (Frankel et al. 2011). A recent food
fraud investigation launched by Interpol and Europol during the period of November 2015 to February 2016, seized
seven thousand tons of olive oil fraudulently labeled as extra-virgin from Italy (Europol 2016).
The spate of food fraud scandals over the last decade and
the potentially devastating consequences for consumers
and industry raise important questions about the impact of
food fraud incidents on consumer behavior. Evidence on
consumer response to food fraud is just developing, mirroring an increase in monitoring and media attention to
food fraud. Scientists confirmed there were 60 percent as
many incidents of food adulteration in two years (2011 and
2012) as had been identified in the 30 years between 1980
and 2010, while media coverage of incidents increased by
nearly 80 percent (Johnson 2014).
To address the gap in evidence, researchers in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln examined how information about food
fraud incidents affects consumers’ valuation of products.
Specifically, the study examined (1) changes in consumers’
valuation of EVOO after they received information about
food fraud, (2) how information about food fraud attributable to one country affects valuation for products from other countries, and (3) how information about food fraud
affects the valuation of olive oils in different price segments.
To examine the effect of food fraud on consumer valuation,
the researchers developed a laboratory experiment based
on the demand-revealing Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism (BDM). In the BDM mechanism, participants
are presented with a good and asked to submit a bid (that
is, their valuation) for it. Then, an “experiment” price is
randomly drawn from a distribution of prices. If the participant’s bid is higher than the randomly drawn
“experiment” price, the participant purchases the good but
pays the “experiment” price. This separation of the participant’s value from the price that they pay means that the
participant has no incentive to underbid for the item. Researchers use this approach to collect information about
participants’ true valuations for items.
In this study, 107 olive oil consumers participated in the
laboratory experiment. All experiment sessions were conducted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln between September and November 2017. The experimental design consisted of two valuation stages. In the first stage, participants
submitted their valuation for extra virgin olive oils from
Italy, Greece, and the U.S. (California). Participants evaluated two 500 milliliter (ml) bottles from each country, one
of which is sold at retail in a daily-use price range ($5-10),

and one of which is sold at a premium range ($24-29)
(see Table 1).
Table 1: Descriptive information of olive oil used in
the experiment
Country
of Origin
Greece, Italy &
United States

Bottle
Size

Shelf Price
Range

500 ml

$5-10

High-priced Greece, Italy &
EVOO
United States

500 ml

$24-29

Olive Oil
Low-priced
EVOO

Source: Laboratory experiment

After submitting their valuation for the six bottles of
EVOO, research participants responded to a short survey on demographic variables, which included one
question about whether participants were aware of the
occurrence of food fraud. Next, participants in the experiment read a text about Italian olive oil. The text
included general information about the Italian olive oil
industry, but also discussed real-world studies on cases
of mislabeling or adulteration of Italian EVOO, including those mentioned above. We included Greek and
California EVOO brands to examine how participants
responded to producers of the same product who were
not implicated in the text . If consumers reduce their
valuation of Greek and California EVOO in response to
information about Italian scandals, it suggests that the
actions of one producer (or country, in this case) may
create negative externalities for other producers.
In the second valuation stage, participants were again
asked to submit bids for the same set of six EVOO bottles. This was followed by surveys regarding olive oil
knowledge and olive oil market experience.
The analyses of the laboratory experiment data show
that information about food fraud in one country negatively affects the valuation of EVOO from that country
but also from other countries. While participants reduce their valuation of Italian EVOO the most after
receiving information about mislabeling and adulteration—by 51 percent—reductions in the valuation of
Greek and California olive oils are non-negligible. Specifically, participants decrease their valuation of Greek
and Californian EVOO by 13 percent and 9 percent,
respectively, suggesting that consumers’ reaction to
information about food fraud in one country negatively
spills over to perceptions of other countries’ industries
(see Table 2) . The results of this study also show that
after receiving information about Italian olive oil fraud
consumers decrease their valuation for high-priced
EVOO more than that for low-priced

EVOO, irrespective of the country of origin, which indicates that the damage from food fraud may affect high and
low-priced EVOO producers differently.
Table 2: Valuation of EVOO from Italy, Greece, and California before and after
information about food fraud.

Country
Italy
Greece
United States

Stage 1 Valuation:
before Info
$13.03
$12.23
$11.65

Stage 2 Valuation: Decrease in
after Info
Valuation
$6.33
$6.70
$10.63
$1.60
$10.61
$1.04

Percent Decrease
in Valuation
51
13
9

The results of this study can help supply chain managers
and policymakers understand and develop appropriate strategic responses to food fraud by providing evidence of consumer reactions to information about food fraud. Moreover, the findings from this study indicate that food fraud
incidents are not limited to the product in question and
may even affect consumers’ perceptions of the accuracy of
labeling across nations. This highlights the importance of
collaborative, international efforts to prevent or address
food fraud incidents in the agri-food marketing system.
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